Italy has set out by decree how AI-powered facial recognition can be used at the entrances to venues and events: always after the images are captured, never in real time. The same article says who can pay for the equipment — the venue operator or the event organiser — and that it is then handed over, on free loan, to the questura, the provincial police headquarters, which gains its full and exclusive use.
What the decree says
The rule is Decreto Legislativo 9 settembre 2026, n. 160, which brings Italian law into line with Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 on the use of AI systems for police activity and civil and criminal liability. It was published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 214 of 15 September 2026, as act 26G00179, and has been in force since 30 September 2026. The quotations that follow are taken from the «ATTO COMPLETO» printout of that act.
What affects event organisers fits into a single article, Article 10, within Titolo I, devoted to the use of AI systems for police activity. Its heading sums it up: «*Disposizioni in materia di sistemi di videosorveglianza dotati della tecnologia di riconoscimento facciale a posteriori, integrata dall'intelligenza artificiale, per il contrasto dei reati*» — provisions on video surveillance systems fitted with retrospective facial recognition technology, integrated with artificial intelligence, to combat crime.
Paragraph 1 does not authorise new cameras: it starts from the ones the law already permits. «*In tutti i casi in cui specifiche disposizioni di legge consentono l'installazione di sistemi di videosorveglianza, tali sistemi possono essere integrati con componenti di intelligenza artificiale*» — wherever a specific legal provision allows the installation of video surveillance, those systems can be fitted with artificial intelligence components, in compliance with data protection law and the AI Regulation.
Those components are only activated in the cases and ways set out in paragraphs 2 and 3, and always with a delay: «*L'attivazione è effettuata successivamente all'acquisizione delle immagini, con un intervallo di tempo tale da non configurare un'identificazione biometrica remota in tempo reale*» — activation takes place after the images have been acquired, with a time gap such that it does not amount to real-time remote biometric identification for the purposes of the AI Regulation. That time gap is the hinge the whole structure hangs on.
From there, two regimes apply. The one in paragraph 2 goes through a judge: for the retrospective identification of a person sought as a suspect in a crime, the pubblico ministero — at the request of the judicial police officers who activated the systems — asks the giudice per le indagini preliminari for authorisation «*senza ritardo e comunque entro quarantotto ore dal loro avvio*», in any case within 48 hours of activation, and the judge authorises it by reasoned decree «*entro le successive quarantotto ore*», within the following 48 hours. Without authorisation, or outside that window, use is halted and the data, results and outputs are deleted, unless they constitute evidence of the crime.
The one in paragraph 3 does not go through a judge. Under Article 26(10), first subparagraph, of the AI Regulation, no authorisation is needed when the technologies are used «*esclusivamente dopo la commissione di un reato al solo fine dell'identificazione iniziale di una persona potenzialmente indiziata*» — only after a crime has been committed and solely for the initial identification of a potential suspect, based on objective and verifiable facts linked to the incident. There, sole and direct responsibility falls on the ufficiale di pubblica sicurezza designated by the questore or, outside that scenario, the judicial police officer under Article 57 of the code of criminal procedure.
The scanned ticket is the link
Paragraph 4 is the one that turns a piece of criminal-policy law into a rule that runs through the box office. It states that, based on the criteria in paragraph 12(a), the use of the systems in paragraph 1 «*comporta il trattamento automatizzato, delle immagini del volto delle persone che accedono a luoghi o a eventi per i quali sussistono particolari esigenze di ordine e sicurezza pubblica, senza elaborazione dei relativi dati biometrici*» — it entails the automated processing of facial images of people entering venues or events with particular public order and security requirements, without processing their biometric data. The sequence has three steps.
At the door, the facial image of everyone entering is captured and automatically processed, and those images are stored locally, in the reference database set out in paragraph 12(b). Something else goes into that same database: «*Nella medesima base dati sono altresì memorizzati, senza ricorrere a tecnologie di riconoscimento biometrico, i corrispondenti dati anagrafici e, ove previsto un posto assegnato, il relativo identificativo, acquisiti mediante la scansione elettronica dei titoli di accesso*» — identity data, and, where there is an assigned seat, its identifier, are also stored, without resorting to biometric recognition technology, obtained through the electronic scanning of tickets.
Only after a crime has been committed does the biometric element kick in: «*Successivamente alla commissione di un fatto di reato, l'attivazione delle tecnologie di riconoscimento facciale comporta l'elaborazione dei dati biometrici delle immagini presenti nella base dati locale di cui al primo periodo, cui sono associati i dati memorizzati ai sensi del secondo periodo, per l'effettuazione del confronto a posteriori con i dati biometrici estratti dalle immagini del volto della persona indiziata del reato*» — after a criminal act has taken place, the biometric data of the images in the local database referred to in the first sentence — to which the data stored under the second sentence are linked — is processed, in order to carry out a retrospective comparison with the biometric data extracted from the face of the suspect. The link between a face and a name is not made by an identity algorithm. It is made by the scan of the ticket.
Timeframes and safeguards under Article 10
| Safeguard | What Article 10 says |
|---|---|
| Data controller | The Ministero dell'interno – Dipartimento della pubblica sicurezza (paragraph 5) |
| Impact assessment | Carried out in advance and in consultation with the Garante, under Articles 23 and 24 of d.lgs. 51/2018; a single assessment can be valid for all comparable systems (paragraph 6) |
| Data retention | Seven days from collection, with automatic deletion once the period expires (paragraph 7) |
| Access log | Authorised personnel only, with accesses and operations recorded in tamper-proof log files, kept for five years (paragraph 8) |
| Police purposes | The retention periods under Article 10 of the regulation to d.P.R. 15 gennaio 2018, n. 15 remain in force (paragraph 9) |
| Automated decisions | No decision with adverse legal effects on a person may be based solely on the outcome of facial recognition (paragraph 10) |
| Prohibited uses | Untargeted activation with no link to a crime or criminal proceedings, and generalised or indiscriminate biometric monitoring or identification (paragraph 11) |
| Judicial authorisation | Request from the pubblico ministero within 48 hours of activation and a reasoned decree from the giudice per le indagini preliminari within the following 48 hours (paragraph 2) |
| Public cost | The application of the article must not give rise to new or increased costs for the public purse (paragraph 14) |
Who pays for the kit
Paragraph 13 is the other half of the story, and the one that reads differently from an organiser's seat. The installation and maintenance of the AI components and biometric technologies referred to in paragraph 1 «*possono provvedere, senza nuovi o maggiori oneri per la finanza pubblica, i gestori dei luoghi di cui al comma 4, gli organizzatori o promotori degli eventi di cui al medesimo comma, ovvero chi ha la disponibilità delle strutture ove tali eventi si svolgono, in accordo con i proprietari*» — can be provided, without new or increased costs for the public purse, by the operators of the venues, the organisers or promoters of the events, or whoever has the use of the structures where they are held, in agreement with the owners. The text also mentions local authorities in relation to their video surveillance platforms.
The decisive word is «*possono*» — can. It is an option, not an obligation: the decree does not require anyone to install anything. What it puts in writing is that, if someone does install it, it can be the private party running the venue or staging the event.
What happens next is in the following sentence: «*i predetti sistemi sono concessi in comodato gratuito alla questura, che ne acquisisce la completa ed esclusiva disponibilità*» — those systems are handed over on free loan to the questura, which gains full and exclusive use of them. Whoever pays for the equipment does not operate it: they hand it over on loan with nothing in return and lose control of it. And paragraph 14 rounds off the design: «*Dall'attuazione delle disposizioni di cui al presente articolo non devono derivare nuovi o maggiori oneri per la finanza pubblica*» — implementing the article must not give rise to new or increased costs for the public purse.
Paragraph 13 itself adds a rider on the division of roles over data — «*in relazione ai ruoli svolti nel trattamento dei dati personali*» — refers back to d.lgs. 51/2018 and leaves paragraph 5 untouched. We stop here: the data controller is the Ministero dell'interno, and the text does not spell out what practical consequences that rider has for a promoter, nor will this piece attempt to interpret it.
What is still missing
Article 10 has applied since 30 September, but its operational piece is still pending. Paragraph 12 refers to a decree of the Ministro dell'interno, after consulting the Garante, which must set out four things: the criteria for identifying the venues and events referred to in paragraph 4; the arrangements for the automated processing of facial images and their local storage; the technical and organisational security measures; and the data controller's duties under the AI Regulation.
As of 13 October 2026, that ministerial decree has not been issued. Until it exists, there is no official list of which venues and events have those particular public order and security requirements, nor any published rules on how the images are stored locally. An organiser cannot know today whether their venue or event falls within scope.
There is a second piece of background worth noting. The parere of the Garante per la protezione dei dati personali of 14 July 2026, docweb 10275606, examined the draft decree before its approval. On what was then Article 10, paragraph 3 of the draft, the authority objected to «*la memorizzazione locale dei dati biometrici delle persone che accedono a luoghi o eventi interessati*» — the local storage of biometric data of people accessing the venues or events concerned — on the grounds that it did not fit with Article 26(10) of the AI Regulation, which only permits facial recognition for «*ricerche mirate ex post di persone sospettate o condannate*», targeted ex post searches for suspects or convicted persons. It recommended that processing take place only retrospectively on recordings, according to specific operational needs, and not automatically during capture.
The text as finally published moves the provision to paragraph 4 and adds five words: «*senza elaborazione dei relativi dati biometrici*» — without processing the related biometric data. The coincidence between the objection and the safeguard is striking, and that is how we report it, as a sequence of events. There is no document proving that one caused the other.
Why it matters
For anyone selling tickets, the underlying change is one of function. Until now, scanning at the door served two purposes: checking that the ticket is valid and counting people. Paragraph 4 gives it a third, and it is not the promoter who exercises it: that scan is the operation that feeds identity data — and the seat number, if there is one — into a local database, alongside the facial image of whoever has just walked through. What is, in the production workflow, access control becomes, under Article 10's design, the link that lets a name be put to a face whenever needed.
The second reading is a budgetary one, and it is what will decide how much of this is actually seen in practice. Paragraph 14 stops the state from spending on it, and paragraph 13 says who can spend: the venue operator, the organiser, or whoever has use of the structure. The capacity exists only to the extent that some private party pays for it. If this is rolled out across Italy's concert and festival circuit, it will be rolled out with money from venues and promoters.
The third is a governance reading, and the most uncomfortable one: whoever pays does not call the shots. The loan is free and the questura gains full and exclusive use of the system. The data controller is the Ministero dell'interno, and activation depends on a judge or a public security officer, never on whoever bought the hardware. Funding the kit means taking on the cost of infrastructure that is then neither operated nor controlled by the person who paid for it.
None of this is an obligation yet, and the criteria for knowing which events it covers are still pending. What is already settled is the funding and the transfer of control, so by the time the paragraph 12 decree arrives, the conversation with the venue will not be starting from zero.
The Italian context sets the direction of travel. Public performance permits are already a dense procedure — see the guide to pubblico spettacolo licences — ticket issuing is governed through the biglietteria with sigillo fiscale and SIAE, and in 2026 AGCOM fined sales outside the issuing system €5,000 per accredited event. Italy has for years treated the ticket as a named, traceable document. Article 10 adds to that trail the face of whoever presents it.
What to do about this
- Check what the venue contract says about video surveillance and artificial intelligence. Space-hire contracts talk about cameras and private security, not about AI components fitted to those cameras. Ask in writing whether the venue has them, or plans to integrate them, and whether the system is on loan to the questura during your event.
- Document where the scan data goes, before the event. If the ticket reader feeds a third party's local database, that has to be in your record of processing activities and in the privacy information given at purchase: the clause buyers sign today is designed for capacity control and ticket delivery, and it falls short if the venue has an Article 10 system in place. Also put in writing each party's role in that flow: platform, door staff, security firm and venue.
- Decide what to do about seat numbering. Paragraph 4 stores the identifier of the posto assegnato when there is one: a seated event feeds in one more piece of data than a standing one. Check exactly which field your system exposes at the scan.
- Don't accept clauses that invoke Article 10 as though it were settled. The criteria for identifying venues and events are to be set by a decree of the Ministro dell'interno that has not been issued. Until then, any requirement based on a list of affected venues has no published rule behind it.
- Keep both timeframes in mind if an incident ends up in proceedings. Data in the local database is deleted seven days after collection; logs last five years.
- And before the technology, the door operation. Who scans, with what device, and what happens if it fails: how event entry is organised settles more incidents than any AI component.